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Delivery-Secrecy Tradeoff for Cache-Enabled
Stochastic Networks:
Content Placement Optimization
Qian Yang, Hui-Ming Wang, and Tong-Xing Zheng
Abstract—Wireless caching has been widely recognized as
a promising technique for efficient content delivery. In this
paper, by taking different file secrecy levels into consideration,
physical-layer security oriented content placement is optimized
in a stochastic cache-enabled cellular network. We propose an
analytical framework to investigate the nontrivial file delivery-
secrecy tradeoff. Specifically, we first derive the closed-form
expressions for the file hit and secrecy probabilities. The global
optimal probabilistic content placement policy is then analytically
derived in terms of hit probability maximization under file
secrecy constraints. Numerical results are demonstrated to verify
our analytical findings and show that the targeted file secrecy
levels are crucial in balancing the file delivery-secrecy tradeoff.
Index Terms—Cache-enabled cellular networks, content place-
ment, physical-layer security, stochastic geometry.
I. INTRODUCTION
By distributing content across multiple network nodes,
caching is an effective way to shift the huge traffic from
peak to off-peak hours in cellular networks with the increasing
popularity of multimedia streaming and sharing [1], [2]. Many
efforts have been devoted to investigating efficient content
placement in a variety of cache-enabled networks so as to
reduce delivery latency [3]–[7]. In [3], an optimal randomized
content placement policy is proposed to maximize the cache
hit probability in a wireless cellular network. The optimal
caching probabilities are derived in [4] by further considering
the channel selection diversity and network interference. In
[5], the tradeoff between the content diversity and cooperative
gains is investigated. The research on content placement is also
extended to multicasting [6] and heterogeneous [7] networks.
Apart from the aforementioned focus on the efficient content
delivery, the content security issues like being eavesdropped
by non-paying subscribers or malicious attackers have drawn
increasing attention. However, the study on these security
issues in cache-enabled networks is still in its infancy. Most
of the existing work as in [8], [9] aims to improve the
network security based on the coded caching scheme proposed
in [1], while leaving the physical-layer channel dynamics
unexplored in the context of physical-layer security. Note
that physical-layer security, as an alternative or complement
to cryptography, has drawn much attention in ensuring the
security of wireless communications since it can guarantee
unbreakable (perfect) secrecy [10]. Only in a very recent
contribution [11], a cooperative caching scheme based on
the physical-layer security is proposed to safeguard video
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streaming in a backhaul-limited network. However, only a
fixed network topology is considered and the global channel
state information is assumed in [11]. Besides, the cached files
can have different secrecy levels such as the different access
permission types for paid video-streaming services, which is
largely ignored by most of the existing literature. To the best of
our knowledge, the physical-layer security issue in the cache-
enabled stochastic networks with dynamic content-centric user
association and files of different secrecy levels has not been
studied before. Moreover, there exists a nontrivial tradeoff in
dealing with two basic file properties, namely file popularity
and file secrecy, in terms of maximizing the hit probability
against eavesdropping. For instance, it can be unfavorable to
cache popular files across many cache-enabled nodes when
these files are subject to a high secrecy level, otherwise the
file security would be easily compromised. Therefore, how to
find the optimal caching policy under this scenario is of great
importance yet remains unknown.
In this paper, we propose an analytical framework to tackle
the file delivery-secrecy tradeoff and derive the optimal content
placement policy in a stochastic cellular network with files
of different secrecy levels for the first time. Different from
[3]–[7], our work takes the property of different file secrecy
levels into account and uncovers the intrinsic delivery-secrecy
tradeoff, which further yields the results fundamentally dif-
ferent from the conventional ones. Many new insights and
the impacts of various network parameters on the nontrivial
delivery-secrecy tradeoff are unveiled in our paper.
II. NETWORK MODEL
A. Network Topology
We consider a stochastic cache-enabled cellular network,
where the locations of base stations (BSs) are modeled as a
two-dimensional homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP) Φ
with density λ. The user density in the network is assumed to
be much larger than the BS density such that all the BSs are
active as in [4], [7]. Additionally, there are multiple passive
eavesdroppers (e.g., non-paying subscribers) aiming to wiretap
different kinds of legitimate transmission (e.g., paid video-
streaming services corresponding to different membership
grades) with different secrecy levels. The locations of all the
eavesdroppers are represented by another homogeneous PPP
Φe with density λe. Each network node has a single antenna.
To alleviate backhaul pressure for file requests from the
network users, each BS is equipped with a local cache with
a predetermined storage size C. The size of each file (or file
fragment) is normalized to the unit size, and at most C files
(or fragments) can be cached at each BS.
B. File Properties
The total number of different confidential files in the net-
work is F (F > C), and the files are denoted by the collection
F = {1, . . . , F}. Each file f ∈ F has two kinds of properties as
follows. For one thing, as commonly adopted in [2]–[7], each
user requests all the F files with a given popularity distribution.
2For instance, under the Zipf distribution the probability for
each user to request file f ∈ F is given as
qf =
1/ f β∑F
i=1 1/iβ
, ∀ f ∈ F, (1)
where β ≥ 0 denotes the skewness of the popularity distribu-
tion. We will use this popularity distribution hereinafter.
For another thing, each file can have different secrecy levels
as another file property, which is not considered in [3]–[7].
This property is of great importance in a lot of commercial and
military applications. For instance, in video streaming services,
some video files can be of high secrecy levels and available
to only certain users with qualified membership, while other
files may be not. In this paper, we propose to use different
secrecy constraints to account for different file secrecy levels.
The secrecy constraint for file i is characterized by
Psi ≥ ǫi, ∀i ∈ F, (2)
where Psi denotes the secrecy probability (will be defined
in Section III-B) for the transmission of file i, and ǫi is the
corresponding secrecy level. A high secrecy level is demanded
by imposing a large ǫi .
C. Content Delivery and Secrecy Schemes
As in [3]–[7], we adopt a probabilistic content placement
policy for caching. Specifically, each BS independently caches
file i with probability pi for i ∈ F. The caching probabilities
{pi}Fi=1 are subject to the cache storage constraint given by
F∑
i=1
pi ≤ C. (3)
As illustrated in [3], once given (3) there always exists a
specific caching scheme satisfying the per-BS cache storage
constraint. In this regard, how to optimize {pi}Fi=1 under file
secrecy constraints is the main focus of this paper.
Once the caching process is fulfilled during off-peak hours,
the locations of the BSs with file i available can be represented
as a PPP Φi with density λi , piλ for i ∈ F according to the
thinning theory of PPP [12]. The BSs without caching file
i are thereby characterized by another independent PPP Φc
i
with density λc
i
, (1 − pi)λ. All the channels from the BSs
and to users are assumed to be quasi-static and undergo small-
scale Rayleigh fading combined with large-scale path loss. We
consider a content-centric association policy as in [6], [7]. In
particular, any user requesting file i will be associated to the
nearest BS in Φi. When multiple files are available at a BS,
multiple users may associate to it, and the BS transmits each
on-demand file in a round-robin scheduling manner.
In this paper, we consider the scenario where the eavesdrop-
pers are the internal users of the network but have no access
to the confidential files. A non-colluding and eavesdropper-
centric wiretapping scenario is considered. For a typical eaves-
dropper, it tries to individually decode each confidential file
transmitted from the closest BS with the file available. To
safeguard communication security, we assume that a secrecy
guard zone is set around each BS as in [13]. The guard
zone is modeled as a disk with radius D centered at each
BS, where as commonly assumed each BS can individually
detect the existence of eavesdroppers through their location
measurements or a special power-aware medium access control
(MAC) protocol [14] since the eavesdroppers are internal
users. Once the eavesdropper is detected, the BS transmits
artificial noise (AN) instead of secrecy files with the maximum
transmit power for anti-eavesdropping.
D. Problem Formulation for Delivery-Secrecy Tradeoff
As pointed out in [7], the hit probability, defined as the
probability of successful content delivery, is an important per-
formance metric which closely reflects the latency reduction
of the packet transmission via a backhaul network. Therefore,
we aim to maximize the average hit probability Pc under file
secrecy constraints, which is mathematically represented as
maximize
{pi }Fi=1
Pc ,
F∑
i=1
qiPci (4a)
s.t. (2), (3), 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ F, (4b)
where Pci is the conditional hit probability given that file i
is requested. Note that problem (4) captures a fundamental
delivery-secrecy tradeoff in the cache-enabled network with
files of different secrecy levels. Intuitively, a large caching
probability is beneficial for improving the hit probability, while
the security of the file can be more easily compromised by
caching across a large number of BSs.
III. HIT PROBABILITY AND FILE SECRECY PROBABILITY
In this section, the file hit and secrecy probabilities are
respectively investigated. Since the receiver noise is far smaller
than the experienced interference in the network, we focus on
the network performance in the interference-limited regime.
A. File Hit Probability
To calculate the averaged hit probability, we first focus on
the hit probability Pci conditioned on that file i is requested
by a typical user located at the origin based on Slivnyak’s
theorem [12]. According to the secrecy scheme of guard zones
introduced in Section II-C, the set of actual file transmitters
for file i is approximated by a thinned PPP Φai with density
λai = λi exp
(
−λeπD2
)
, (5)
where the term exp(−λeπD2) denotes the void probability that
no eavesdropper is located in the guard zone as in [13]. Simi-
larly, the counterpart of Φai is denoted by another independent
PPP Φa¯i with density λa¯i = λi
(
1 − exp (−λeπD2) ). Note that
Φ = Φai ∪ Φa¯i ∪ Φci .
Based on (5), the associated BS for the typical user request-
ing file i is denoted by Xb = argmaxX∈Φai P‖X ‖−α, where P
is the maximum transmit power of BSs and α is the large-scale
path-loss exponent. The total interference experienced by the
typical user requesting file i is given by
I(i) =
∑
X∈Φc
i
∪Φa¯i
PhX ‖X ‖−α
︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
I0(i), interference of
the other files and AN
+
∑
X∈Φai \Xb
PhX ‖X ‖−α
︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
I1(i), interference from
unassociated BSs with file i
, (6)
3where the random variable hX ∼ Exp(1) accounts for the
small-scale Rayleigh fading of the channel from BS X to
the typical user. Note that the received signals from the
unassociated BSs with file i available may contain the desired
information, but they are incoherent due to longer signal
arriving delay and thereby treated as interference I1(i) in (6)
similar to [4], [6], [7]. Given the targeted signal-to-interference
ratio (SIR) γu , the conditional hit probability Pci is defined as
the probability that the actual SIR is larger than γu for i ∈ F.
The hit probability Pc is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The file hit probability Pc is given as
Pc =
F∑
i=1
qi
pi
τ1(γu)pi + τ2(γu)
, (7)
with τ1(γ) , 1 + κ2(γ) − κ1(γ), τ2(γ) , κ1(γ) exp(πλeD2),
κ1(γ) , δγδB(1 − δ, δ), κ2(γ) , δγ1−δ 2F1(1, 1 − δ; 2 − δ;−γ),
and δ , 2
α
, where B(·) and 2F1(·) denote the beta function [15,
eq. (8.380.1)] and the Gauss hypergeometric function [15, eq.
(9.14.2)], respectively.
Proof: See Appendix A.
From Theorem 1, we find that Pc increases with the caching
probability {pi}Fi=1 aligned with intuition. Furthermore, Pc
decreases as the density of the eavesdroppers or the area of
the guard zones becomes larger. The reason behind this is that
due to the setting of guard zones the number of actual file
transmitters becomes smaller under these situations.
B. File Secrecy Probability
As in [13], the actual transmitters for file i can be approxi-
mated by a homogeneous PPP with density λai outside B(o,D)
from the viewpoint of the typical eavesdropper located at the
origin, where B(o, r) denotes a disk of radius r centered at o.
For all the BSs in Φ ∩ B(o,D), they transmit AN to combat
eavesdropping according to the guard zone setting.
The targeted BS for the typical eavesdropper to wiretap
file i is denoted by Xe = argmaxX∈Φai \B(o,D) P‖X ‖−α. The
probability density function (PDF) of the distance ‖Xe ‖ can
be computed using the void probability of PPP as
f‖Xe ‖(r) = 2πλair exp
(
−πλai
(
r2 − D2
))
, for r > D. (8)
The received interference at the typical eavesdropper1 for
wiretapping file i is formulated by
Ie(i) =
∑
X∈Φc
i
∪Φa¯i
PhX ‖X ‖−α +
∑
X∈Φai \B(o,D)\Xe
PhX ‖X ‖−α
+
∑
X∈Φai∩B(o,D)
PhX ‖X ‖−α . (9)
The secrecy probability of file i is thereby defined as
Psi = P
{
PhXe ‖Xe ‖−α
Ie(i) < γe
}
, (10)
where γe is the SIR threshold for ensuring the file transmission
security. Note that the definition in (10) corresponds to the
1The method developed in our paper can be easily extended to tackle
the case where the eavesdroppers have the ability of joint decoding. Under
that case, the eavesdroppers only suffer from AN, which actually takes a
degenerate form of (9).
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Fig. 1. File secrecy probability versus the SIR threshold under different sizes
of guard zones and the content placement probabilities of file i, where α = 3,
λ = 1
8002m2
, and λe = λ/5.
case where a wiretap code is constructed by setting the rate
redundancy Re = log(1 + γe) to achieve perfect secrecy [10].
Similar to the file hit probability, the expression of Psi and
one of its lower bounds are provided in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The secrecy probability Psi for file i is given
as
Psi =1 −
∫ ∞
D
exp
(
− π ((λci + λa¯i)κ1(γe) + λaiκ2(γe)) r2
−πλaiD2 2F1
(
1, δ; δ + 1;− D
α
γerα
)
︸                                       ︷︷                                       ︸
Θ(r)
)
f‖Xe ‖(r)dr . (11)
One of its lower bounds is obtained by replacing the part Θ(r)
with Θ(D) in (11) and calculating the integral as
Psi > P
L
si , 1 −
exp
(−πD2κ1(γe)λ)
τ1(γe) + τ2(γe)/pi
. (12)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Based on the diminishing distribution of f‖Xe ‖(r) in (8), the
lower bound given in (12) is expected to be tight especially
when λai is large. As validated in Fig. 1, the lower bound
(labeled as “Analytical”) coincides well with the simulation
results and can be used to approximate Psi in constraint (2).
From (12) and Fig. 1, the secrecy probability for a specific
file is a decreasing function of its placement probability as
expected, since caching the file across more BSs incurs a
higher risk of being eavesdropped. Moreover, the file secrecy
probability increases as the guard zone area becomes larger.
IV. OPTIMIZATION FOR DELIVERY-SECRECY TRADEOFF
In this section, we aim to solve problem (4) and find the
optimal caching probabilities maximizing the hit probability
with files of different secrecy levels.
With Psi approximated by P
L
si , problem (4) is changed to
maximize
{pi }Fi=1
Pc s.t. (3), 0 ≤ pi ≤Ψi, ∀i ∈ F, (13)
where Ψi , min
{
1,Ψ ◦
i
}
with
Ψ ◦i ,
τ2(γe)(1 − ǫi)[
e−πD2κ1(γe )λ − τ1(γe)(1 − ǫi)
]
+
(14)
4Fig. 2. An illustration for the optimal cache placement strategy under different
file secrecy levels, where the shadowed parts stand for the optimal placement
probability.
accounting for the file secrecy constraints in (2) and [x]+ ,
max{0, x}. It is not hard to see that problem (13) is convex, and
it can be thereby optimally solved by the Lagrange method.
The Lagrange function for problem (13) is given by
L({pi}Fi=1, ν) = Pc + ν
(
C −
F∑
i=1
pi
)
, (15)
where ν ≥ 0 is the dual variable corresponding to constraint
(3). Since the objective function in (13) is an increasing
function of {pi}Fi=1, the optimum is given by p⋆i =Ψi, ∀i ∈ F
if
∑F
i=1Ψi ≤ C. Otherwise, constraint (3) is active at the
optimum, i.e.,
∑F
i=1 p
⋆
i
= C. By leveraging the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) condition, the optimal placement probabilities
under
∑F
i=1Ψi > C are given in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Under
∑F
i=1Ψi > C, the optimal placement
probabilities {pi}Fi=1 for problem (13) are given by
p⋆i (ν⋆) =

Ψi, p
◦
i
≥Ψi,
p◦
i
, 0 < p◦
i
<Ψi,
0, p◦
i
≤ 0,
(16)
where
p◦i ,
1
τ1(γu)
√
τ2(γu)
ν⋆
√
qi − τ2(γu)
τ1(γu)
, (17)
and the optimal ν⋆ satisfies
∑F
i=1 p
⋆
i
(ν⋆) = C.
Proof: According to the KKT condition, when 0 <
p⋆
i
(ν⋆) <Ψi the optimal placement probabilities can be found
as p⋆
i
(ν⋆) = p◦i by setting the first-order derivative of the
Lagrange function in (15) to zero. The two boundary results
are obtained using the complementary slackness condition
[16]. The proof is completed.
Since p◦
i
in (17) is a deceasing function of ν⋆, the optimal
ν⋆ can be found by a bisection search. According to Theorem
3, the optimal cache placement strategy under different file
secrecy levels is illustrated in Fig. 2. In the figure, p◦i actually
reflects the popularity of file i since it is an increasing function
of qi from (17). Unlike the results in [3]–[7], even though the
popularity is diminishing as the file index becomes larger, the
same trend does not hold for the optimal placement probability
due to the secrecy property of each file captured by {Ψi}Fi=1.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Some numerical results are presented in this section to show
the superiority of the proposed optimal content placement
(OCP) strategy. The benchmark schemes include caching the
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Fig. 4. The hit probability versus the radius of guard zones under different
content placement schemes with ǫmax = 0.5 and β = 0.7.
most popular contents (MPC) and caching the least classified
contents (LCC) under file secrecy constraints.2 The parameter
settings are as follows, unless otherwise specified: α = 3,
λ = 1
8002m2
, λe = λ/5, C = 5, F = 10, D = 200 m, γu = −5
dB, γe = −7 dB, and the file secrecy levels are independently
generated as ǫmaxRand(1) with Rand(1) denoting a random
variable uniformly distributed in (0, 1).
In Fig. 3, the performance of the proposed OCP scheme
is compared with the results obtained by MPC and LCC.
It can be observed from Fig. 3 that the proposed scheme
yields the largest hit probability and the analytical results
coincide well with the simulation ones. Moreover, according
to Fig. 3 the performance of MPC is close to the optimal
one when the content popularity is skewed (a larger β) as
expected. Contrarily, the hit probability obtained by LCC
is larger when the content popularity becomes uniform (a
smaller β) due to the absence of the popularity information
in carrying out LCC. Furthermore, from Fig. 3 the optimal
hit probability decreases as ǫmax grows, which reflects the
fundamental tradeoff between content delivery and content
secrecy. However, the performance obtained by LCC can be
improved by imposing more stringent secrecy constraints,
since there can be more storage left for caching the other
popular files. It is also interesting to notice that the optimal
hit probability is not necessarily an increasing function of β
under the secrecy-limited case (ǫmax = 0.8) from Fig. 3.
2Similar to the MPC scheme following the descending order of qi , the
LCC scheme follows the ascending order of ǫi during the caching process.
5The impact of the guard zone radius D on the hit probability
is shown in Fig. 4. It is observed that there exists an optimal
D for maximizing the hit probability. Actually, this parameter
captures the tradeoff between file hit and secrecy probabilities,
since a large D reduces the density of actual file transmitters
and thereby the file hit probability while it strengthens file
secrecy. However, for the LCC scheme, the hit probability
monotonically decreases with an increase in D from Fig. 4.
The reason behind is that the file secrecy levels for the cached
files are low. Therefore, the effect of D on file secrecy is less
pronounced compared with content delivery.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the security issues in a
cache-enabled stochastic network. In particular, an analytical
framework has been proposed to tackle the file delivery-
secrecy tradeoff. Based on the closed-form expressions of the
file hit and secrecy probabilities, we have analytically obtained
the optimal content placement policy in terms of hit probability
maximization. Numerical results show the superiority of the
proposed scheme and the impacts of file secrecy levels and
the guard zone size on the file delivery-secrecy tradeoff.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Based on (6), the conditional hit probability Pci for the
typical user requesting file i is calculated as
Pci = EΦ
{
exp
(
−γu ‖Xb ‖
α
P
(I0(i) + I1(i))
)}
=
∫ ∞
0
LI0
(γu
P
rα
)
LI1
(γu
P
rα
)
f‖Xb ‖(r)dr, (18)
where f‖Xb ‖(r) = 2πλair exp
(−πλair2) is the PDF of ‖Xb ‖.
The Laplace transform of I0(i) is computed as
LI0 (s)
(a)
= EΦc
i
,Φa¯i

∏
X∈Φc
i
∪Φa¯i
EhX [exp (−PhX ‖X ‖−αs)]

(b)
= exp
(
−2π(λci + λa¯i)
∫ ∞
0
(
1 − 1
1 + sPr−α
)
rdr
)
(c)
= exp
(
−δπ(λci + λa¯i)(sP)δB(1 − δ, δ)
)
, (19)
where (a) follows from the independence of different small-
scale fading terms, (b) holds due to the use of the probability
generating functional lemma (PGFL) over PPP [12], and (c)
is derived by using the variable change x = sPr−α and
[15, eq. (3.194.3)]. Similarly, the Laplace transform of I1(i)
conditioned on ‖Xb ‖ = r is computed as
LI1 (s, r)
= exp
(
−2πλai
∫ ∞
r
(
1 − 1
1 + sPz−α
)
zdz
)
= exp
(
−δπλaisP r
2−α
1 − δ 2F1(1, 1 − δ; 2 − δ;−sPr
−α)
)
. (20)
Substituting (19) and (20) into (18) and calculating the
integral, we obtain Pci =
pi
τ1(γu )pi+τ2(γu ) . The hit probability
is thereby given in (7) with the aid of its definition in (4a).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Based on (10), the secrecy probability for file i is given by
Psi = 1 −
∫ ∞
D
LIe
(γe
P
rα
)
f‖Xe ‖(r)dr, (21)
where LIe (s) is the Laplace transform of Ie(i) condition on
‖Xe ‖ = r. From (9), LIe (s) = LI0(s) · LI1 (s, r) · LI2 (s) with
LI2 (s) , E
{ ∏
X∈Φai∩B(o,D)
EhX [exp (−PhX ‖X ‖−αs)]
}
= exp
(
− 2πλai
∫ D
0
(
1 − 1
1 + sPr−α
)
rdr
)
(d)
= exp
(
−πλaiD2 2F1
(
1, δ; δ + 1;− 1
sPD−α
))
, (22)
where (d) is derived by using the variable change x = sPr−α
and [15, eq. (3.194.2)]. Therefore, with LIe (s) and (21), Psi
takes the form of (11), of which the closed form is difficult
to obtain. However, since the part Θ(r) in (11) is a decreasing
function of r, a lower bound of Psi is thereby given in (12).
REFERENCES
[1] M. A. Maddah-Ali and U. Niesen, “Fundamental limits of caching,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 60, no. 5, pp. 2856–2867, May 2014.
[2] E. Bastug, M. Bennis, and M. Debbah, “Living on the edge: The role
of proactive caching in 5G wireless networks,” IEEE Commun. Mag.,
vol. 52, no. 8, pp. 82–89, Aug. 2014.
[3] B. Błaszczyszyn and A. Giovanidis, “Optimal geographic caching in
cellular networks,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Commun. (ICC), London,
U.K., Jun. 2015, pp. 3358–3363.
[4] S. H. Chae and W. Choi, “Caching placement in stochastic wireless
caching helper networks: Channel selection diversity via caching,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 15, no. 10, pp. 6626–6637, Oct. 2016.
[5] S. H. Chae, T. Q. S. Quek, and W. Choi, “Content placement for wireless
cooperative caching helpers: A tradeoff between cooperative gain and
content diversity gain,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 16, no. 10,
pp. 6795–6807, Oct. 2017.
[6] Y. Cui, D. Jiang, and Y. Wu, “Analysis and optimization of caching
and multicasting in large-scale cache-enabled wireless networks,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 15, no. 7, pp. 5101–5112, Jul. 2016.
[7] J. Wen, K. Huang, S. Yang, and V. O. K. Li, “Cache-enabled hetero-
geneous cellular networks: Optimal tier-level content placement,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 16, no. 9, pp. 5939–5952, Sep. 2017.
[8] A. Sengupta, R. Tandon, and T. C. Clancy, “Fundamental limits of
caching with secure delivery,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security,
vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 355–370, Feb. 2015.
[9] F. Gabry, V. Bioglio, and I. Land, “On edge caching with secrecy
constraints,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Commun. (ICC), Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, May 2016, pp. 1–6.
[10] M. Bloch and J. Barros, Physical-Layer Security: From Information
Theory to Security Engineering. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2011.
[11] L. Xiang, D. W. K. Ng, R. Schober, and V. W. S. Wong, “Cache-enabled
physical layer security for video streaming in backhaul-limited cellular
networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 736–751,
Feb. 2018.
[12] S. N. Chiu, D. Stoyan, W. S. Kendall, and J. Mecke, Stochastic Geometry
and its Applications, 3rd ed. Chichester, U.K.: John Wiley & Sons Ltd,
2013.
[13] X. Zhou, R. K. Ganti, J. G. Andrews, and A. Hjørungnes, “On the
throughput cost of physical layer security in decentralized wireless
networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 10, no. 8, pp. 2764–
2775, Aug. 2011.
[14] A. Hasan and J. G. Andrews, “The guard zone in wireless ad hoc
networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 897–906,
Mar. 2007.
[15] I. S. Gradshteyn and I. M. Ryzhik, Table of Integrals, Series, and
Products, 7th ed. New York, NY, USA: Academic, 2007.
[16] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization. Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004.
